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Judicial courts regularly encourage, and sometimes require,
disputants to resolve their differences outside the courtroom
through negotiation, mediation, and other forms of dispute reso-
lution.1  There are, however, very few statutory provisions in fed-
1 For an introduction to this topic, see SOCIETY OF PROFESSIONALS IN DISPUTE
RESOLUTION, MANDATED PARTICIPATION AND SETTLEMENT COERCION: DISPUTE
RESOLUTION AS IT RELATES TO THE COURTS (1990); and BENJAMIN SOKOLY, INSTI-
TUTIONALIZATION OF COURT-ANNEXED ADR: AN EXAMINATION OF FIVE STATES’
PROVISIONS (unpublished and undated manuscript on file with the authors).  In
Montana, for example, the Montana Supreme Court adopted Rule 54 in 1996, re-
quiring mediation in worker’s compensation cases, specific domestic-relations dis-
putes, and civil cases seeking a money judgment or monetary damages. MONT. R.
APP. P. 54. During the three-year period from 1997 to 1999, 1820 cases were ap-
pealed to the court, and 698 of those cases were referred to mediation under Rule
54. MATTHEW MCKINNEY & WILLIAM HARMON, THE WESTERN CONFLUENCE: A
GUIDE TO GOVERNING NATURAL RESOURCES 162-63 (2004).  Of the 698 cases, 169
were settled, for a success rate of about 24 percent; other studies demonstrate a
similar degree of success. See id.  at 163.  In the summer of 2000, wildfires burned
more than 300,000 acres in the Bitterroot National Forest, situated along the border
of western Montana and Idaho. Id.  at 162.  To expedite the implementation of a
forest-restoration plan, the U.S. Forest Service limited public participation and by-
passed its own internal appeals process. Id.  In December 2001, Undersecretary of
Agriculture Mark Rey approved a plan to remove 176 million board feet of timber
from 46,000 acres on the Bitterroot. Id.  Shortly after the restoration plan was ap-
proved, seven environmental groups, decrying the plan’s impact on watersheds and
wildlife habitat, filed a lawsuit contesting the Agency’s refusal to accept administra-
tive appeals. Id.  A U.S. district court judge sided with the plaintiffs, holding that
the process violated the public’s right to be involved in decision making: “It is pre-
sumptuous to believe that the agency’s final decision has a perfection about it that
would not be illuminated by interested comment, questioning, or requests for justifi-
cation of propositions asserted in it.” Id.  (quoting Katharine Q. Seelye, Judge Over-
rules Decision Allowing Logging of Burned Trees , N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 9, 2002, at A14,
available at  http://www.fire.uni-freiburg.de/media/news_01102002_us2.htm).  The
court granted a temporary injunction against the logging plan to continue until the
Forest Service complied with its own established appeals process. Id.  at 162.  When
the Forest Service appealed that decision, the court ordered the Agency to enter
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eral natural-resources and environmental law compelling
disputants to resolve their differences prior to litigation.  Where
such provisions do exist, they apparently have not been much
used.
The purpose of this Article is to shed some light on the merits
of statutorily mandated dispute resolution in federal natural-re-
sources and environmental law.  We begin by describing section
164(e) of the Clean Air Act (CAA),2 which mandates the use of
a dispute-resolution process to resolve selected types of disputes
among Indian tribes, states, and the Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA).  We review the statutory and administrative his-
tory of the provision and examine the only four instances in
which it was invoked.  We then highlight a number of lessons
learned from the experience of the CAA that might serve as use-
ful guidance for other mandatory dispute-resolution processes.
Finally, we conclude by offering a few observations on the place
of mandatory dispute resolution in federal natural-resources and
environmental law.  Appendix 1 offers an overview of other stat-
utory models of dispute resolution in federal environmental pol-
icy, ranging from intergovernmental consultation to mandated
mediation.
I
THE CLEAN AIR ACT
A. Statutory Framework of Section 164(e)
Congress added section 164 in the 1977 amendments to the
CAA to require the prevention of significant deterioration of air
quality (PSD) in areas with relatively clean air.3  The legislative
history of section 164 indicates congressional intent to strengthen
the authority of states and Indian tribes (1) to protect the air
into mediation with the Undersecretary and the regional forester present in Mis-
soula. Id.  Thereafter, environmental groups and loggers negotiated a new plan with
the U.S. Forest Service to salvage 55 million board feet of timber, prohibiting re-
moval of any trees more than twenty-two inches in diameter and protecting 15,000
acres of roadless area. Id.  As the timber sale moved forward, the Forest Service
filed a motion requesting clarification of the settlement agreement, arguing that the
twenty-two-inch size limit applied only to living trees, and that loggers should be
allowed to cut 199 dead trees in the larger-size class. Id.  In June 2003, a federal
judge denied the Agency’s request. Id. ; see also  Sherry Devlin, Ruling Protects
Dead Bitterroot Trees , MISSOULIAN, June 28, 2003, available at  http://
www.missoulian.com/articles/2003/06/27/news/local/news03.txt.
2 42 U.S.C. § 7474(e) (2006).
3 Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-95, 91 Stat. 685.
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quality in these areas by redesignating them into more protective
classifications, and (2) to protect their own air quality by partici-
pating in decisions about new permits in adjacent jurisdictions.4
To date, tribal authorities governing six different Indian reser-
vations have sought to increase air-quality protection by redesig-
nating their lands from Class II to Class I: the Northern
Cheyenne (1977), the Flathead (1981), and the Fort Peck (1983),
all in Montana;5 the Spokane in Washington (1991);6 the
Yavapai-Apache in Arizona (1996);7 and the Forest County Pota-
watomi in Wisconsin (1999).8  In most cases, the tribes have been
motivated by potential development on nearby lands; “most res-
ervations constitute small islands within states, so there is sub-
stantial risk that a source located outside the reservation will
affect air quality within the reservation.”9  States have not
redesignated their lands to protect air quality,10 and in some
cases have objected to such redesignations by Indian tribes, argu-
ing that the tribes’ decisions will limit their ability to pursue eco-
nomic development.11  Federal land managers (FLMs) also have
not redesignated any lands to Class I status.
Acknowledging that PSD redesignations and major-source
PSD permit applications might result in this type of conflict be-
tween sovereign governments with different priorities, Congress
included section 164(e) in the 1977 CAA amendments.  Section
164(e) authorizes the EPA to participate as a mediator and, if
necessary, as a final arbiter to resolve such disputes.12  Initially,
the section was written to resolve disputes between states; the
decision to include Indian tribes was accompanied by strong
statements of congressional intent to strengthen both states’ and
4 See H.R. REP. NO. 95-294, at 1-2 (1977), reprinted in  4 LIBRARY OF CONGRESS,
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE CLEAN AIR ACT AMENDMENTS OF 1977, at 2468-69
(1978) [hereinafter LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF 1977].
5 40 C.F.R. § 52.1382(c) (2006).
6 40 C.F.R. § 52.2497(b)-(c) (2006).
7 40 C.F.R. § 52.150(a)-(b) (2006).
8 Joseph Kreye, The Forest County Potawatomi Request Redesignation Under the
Clean Air Act , 4 WIS. ENVTL. L.J. 87, 87 (1997).
9 Craig N. Oren, The Protection of Parklands from Air Pollution: A Look at Cur-
rent Policy , 13 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 313, 363 (1989).
10 See ARNOLD W. REITZE, JR., AIR POLLUTION CONTROL LAW: COMPLIANCE
AND ENFORCEMENT 111 (2001).
11 See, e.g. , discussion infra  Part I.A.2.
12 42 U.S.C. § 7474(e) (2006).
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tribes’ rights, and to reduce the EPA’s discretion in implementing
the CAA.13
Section 164(e) applies in two instances: (1) an affected state or
a tribe disagrees with the other’s redesignation of a PSD area, or
(2) an affected state or tribe asserts that another state’s proposed
PSD permit for a major new emitting facility will cause or con-
tribute to a deterioration of the affected state’s or tribal reserva-
tion’s air quality.14
Any party to an intergovernmental CAA dispute may request
a section 164(e) dispute-resolution process.15  If so requested, the
EPA must convene negotiations among the parties, and if the ne-
gotiations fail, the EPA must make its own determination to re-
solve the dispute.16  Thus, in effect, section 164(e) is a binding
arbitration provision with the EPA in the decision-making
position.
Although the EPA has final authority to resolve a dispute if a
section 164(e) negotiation fails, the Agency’s discretion at that
point is limited.  Congress deliberately restricted the EPA’s au-
thority to disapprove a redesignation request.17  The EPA’s pre-
1977 regulations allowed the Agency to override a state’s or a
tribe’s classification of an area if the state or tribe improperly
weighed energy, environment, or other factors.18  Under the 1977
amendments, by contrast, the EPA’s role is to determine whether
the requesting state or tribe followed specific procedural require-
ments, thereby ensuring that the local decision-making process
provided ample opportunity for interested parties to express
their views.19
Moreover, the legislative history of section 164(e) indicates the
intergovernmental dispute-resolution provision was not intended
to encroach on the sovereignty of Indian tribes.  For example,
during consideration of the House Conference Committee Re-
13 H.R. Res. 733, 95th Cong. (1977), reprinted in  3 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF
1977, supra  note 4, at 326. R
14 42 U.S.C. § 7474(e).
15 Id.
16 Id.
17 See Redesignation of the Yavapai-Apache Reservation to a PSD Class I Area;
Dispute Resolution, 61 Fed. Reg. 56,450-02, 56,454  (Nov. 1, 1996), for a summary of
this portion of the legislative history.
18 Id.
19 See H.R. REP. NO. 95-294, at 1-2, 146-47 (1977), reprinted in  4 LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY OF 1977, supra  note 4, at 2468-69, 2613-14. R
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port, Congressman Rogers, Chairman of the House Subcommit-
tee on Health and the Environment, cautioned,
The conference bill provides that both States and Indian tribes
will continue to have the power they now have to redesignate
their lands to a new air quality classification.  In cases where
another State may object to such a re-classification, and when
the two jurisdictions cannot amicably come to agreement, the
Administrator is granted the power to review the redesigna-
tion.  But it is intended that the Administrator’s review of such
determinations by tribal governments be exercised with ut-
most caution to avoid unnecessarily substituting his judgment
for that of the tribe. . . . [T]he Administrator should reverse
the determination made by an Indian governing body to re-
classify its land, only under the most serious circumstances.20
Accordingly, the EPA has narrowly interpreted the scope of its
discretion in such situations: “While EPA must ensure procedural
rigor, it is generally inappropriate for EPA to interpose supersed-
ing Federal views on the merits of the resulting State or Tribal
decisions.”21
As one commentator observed, “Section 164(e) of the Clean
Air Act Amendments expresses respect for the semi sovereign
status of Indians on their tribal lands by requiring that the EPA
attempt to resolve disputes through negotiation rather than by
unilateral administrative decision.”22  Another concluded,
“Tribes have . . . used EPA’s policy to work cooperatively with
States and regulated entities to enhance tribal capacity to moni-
tor air quality and to operate air quality programs.”23
In assessing the dispute-resolution mandate of section 164(e),
it is instructive to compare it with the process by which FLMs
participate in PSD permitting decisions.  The FLM has an affirm-
ative duty to protect air quality in Class I areas.24  An FLM
charged with managing a Class I area (e.g., national park, wilder-
ness area, etc.) must be notified of major facilities proposed near
20 H.R. Res. 733, 95th Cong. (1977), reprinted in  3 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF
1977, supra  note 4, at 326. R
21 Redesignation of the Yavapai-Apache Reservation to a PSD Class I Area; Dis-
pute Resolution, 61 Fed. Reg. at 56,454 n.2.
22 TIMOTHY J. SULLIVAN, The Difficulties of Mandatory Negotiation (the Colstrip
Power Plant Case), in RESOLVING ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATORY DISPUTES 56, 74
(Lawrence Susskind et al. eds., 1983).
23 William H. Gelles, Tribal Regulatory Authority Under the Clean Air Act , 3
ENVTL. LAW. 373, 377 (1997).
24 42 U.S.C. § 7475(d)(2)(B) (2006).
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the area or potentially affecting the area.25  The permitting au-
thority must consider the FLM’s evaluation of a source’s impacts,
and may not issue a permit if certain conditions are present un-
less the state’s governor issues a variance.26  There is no intergov-
ernmental negotiation provision in this situation.  If the state
issues a permit using the variance provision and the FLM does
not concur, the issue must be forwarded to the President for a
final decision, which is not subject to judicial review.27
FLMs play an advisory role in the case of PSD redesigna-
tions,28 and there is no provision for negotiation among parties
with differing perspectives.  A state contemplating a PSD redes-
ignation must notify the appropriate FLMs of areas that may be
affected and provide sixty days for the FLMs to make comments
and recommendations.29  As with the state permitting process,
there is no provision for intergovernmental negotiation: the
EPA’s administrator has the limited discretion to disapprove of a
state’s redesignation only if the state fails to meet the procedural
requirements of the CAA, or if the area proposed for redesigna-
tion is not eligible for the proposed classification.30
In 1997, the EPA announced proposed rules to (1) clarify PSD
permit-review procedures for proposed PSD sources that may
adversely affect the air quality of any state or tribal Class I area,
and (2) set forth more specific procedures for the EPA’s resolu-
tion of intergovernmental permit disputes.31  Among other pur-
poses of the rule, the EPA intended to reduce the need for
parties to seek dispute resolution by clarifying the PSD permit-
review procedures.32  The EPA further announced its intention to
examine its dispute-resolution methods and procedures for areas
of possible improvement.33
The EPA also sought public comment “on whether and to what
extent EPA should prescribe the procedures to be followed in
resolving intergovernmental permit disputes under section
25 Id. § 7475(d)(2)(A).
26 Id. § 7475(d)(2)(C)-(D)(i).
27 Id. § 7475(d)(2)(D)(ii).
28 Id. § 7474 (b)(1)(B).
29 Id.
30 Id. § 7474(b)(2).
31 Prevention of Significant Deterioration of Air Quality (PSD) Program: Permit
Review Procedures for Sources That May Adversely Affect Air Quality in Non-
Federal Class I Areas, 62 Fed. Reg. 27,158 (May 16, 1997).
32 See id.
33 Id.  at 27,162.
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164(e),” and on “incentives EPA could create for governments to
resolve their conflicts amicably.”34  We did not find any addi-
tional information on this rulemaking process, as it apparently
was never completed.
In summary, the legislative history and subsequent administra-
tive interpretations of section 164(e) indicate that it was narrowly
tailored to accommodate the unique sovereignty issues arising
when states and tribes have differing perspectives on the best
way to protect air quality in PSD areas.  Section 164(e) offers an
opportunity for states and tribes to enter into limited intergov-
ernmental negotiations to resolve these disputes, rather than first
turning to resolution by federal administrative fiat.
B. Applications of Section 164(e)
As mentioned above, six Indian tribes have requested redesig-
nation of their lands from Class II to Class I.  In three cases the
affected states did not object to the redesignations, so section
164(e) was not invoked.35  This section describes instances in
which section 164(e) has  been invoked for redesignation or PSD
permit issuance.
1. Northern Cheyenne-Colstrip PSD Permit (1979)36
The Northern Cheyenne Indian Reservation is located in
southeastern Montana, about 150 miles east of Billings, and cov-
ers roughly 1200 square miles.  Its western border abuts the Crow
Indian Reservation, which is much larger and more heavily popu-
lated than the Northern Cheyenne Reservation. The company
town of Colstrip, the center of a major coal-burning power com-
plex is about twenty miles to the north.  The Rosebud coal seam,
a valuable source of low-sulfur coal, runs beneath the entire area,
providing the energy source for power production in Colstrip.37
In 1973 the Montana Power Company sought a state permit to
construct two new electricity-generating plants (Units 3 and 4) to
expand its electricity-generating potential at Colstrip.38  The
34 Id.  at 27,165.
35 The Flathead and Fort Peck Reservations in Montana and the Spokane Indian
Reservation in Washington.  For descriptions of their redesignation processes, see
Kreye, supra  note 8 at 93-99. R
36 See generally SULLIVAN, supra  note 22 (providing a detailed account of the R
Northern Cheyenne-Colstrip negotiations that this case study summarizes).
37 Id.  at 56.
38 Id.
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Northern Cheyenne Tribal Council, with environmentalists and
local ranchers, opposed the expansion.  Some expressed concerns
about rapid growth in Colstrip and the potential need for in-
creased police, fire, and health services to deal with spillover ef-
fects on the Reservation.39  Others focused on the air-quality
impacts, asserting that the plant emissions would inevitably de-
grade the Reservation’s clean air.40  Over the next several years,
the Tribe, State, federal agencies, environmentalists, ranchers,
and coal company battled in a number of settings: (1) prepara-
tion of several environmental impact statements, (2) state and
federal permit reviews, and (3) state and federal courts.41
While the dispute over Units 3 and 4 was pending, the Tribal
Council requested a redesignation of its lands to Class I status.42
The EPA granted the request on August 5, 1977, almost simulta-
neously with Congress’ enactment of the 1977 CAA amend-
ments.43  The new classification required the EPA to provide
additional review and to require more restrictive permit condi-
tions, aimed at protecting the Reservation’s air quality.44
After a series of permit decisions and legal challenges, the
EPA announced in April 1979 that it would issue a PSD permit
for the Colstrip project.45  But before the EPA reached a final
decision, the Tribal Council invoked section 164(e), requesting
that the EPA convene negotiations to resolve the dispute over
the proposed plant expansion.46  The EPA requested that the Tri-
bal Council make a threshold showing that the Reservation’s air
quality would be adversely affected by operation of Units 3 and
4.47  The Tribe submitted its response on August 17, 1979.48  On
August 29, 1979, the EPA accepted the Tribe’s threshold showing
39 Id.  at 56-59.  An early analysis predicted that the town’s population would
double with the influx of new workers. See SULLIVAN, supra  note 22,  at 57. R
40 Id.  at 59.
41 See id.  at 59-62.
42 See id.  at 65.
43 See  Conditional Permit to Commence Construction and Operate, The Montana
Power Company Colstrip Units #3 and #4, Envtl. Prot. Agency Region VIII, 1 (Sept.
11, 1979) (on file with the authors) [hereinafter Conditional Permit].
44 See SULLIVAN, supra  note 22, at 65-66. R
45 Id.  at 66.
46 Id.
47 Conditional Permit, supra  note 43, at 2. R
48 Id.
\\server05\productn\O\OEL\21-1\OEL101.txt unknown Seq: 10 10-JAN-07 11:11
10 J. ENVTL. LAW AND LITIGATION [Vol. 21, 1
of visibility impairment, justifying the application of section
164(e).49
The negotiation process commenced in Denver, Colorado, on
September 5, 1979, involving three parties: EPA’s Region 8, the
Northern Cheyenne Tribal Council, and the Montana Power
Company.50  EPA attorney Wilkes McClave directed the negotia-
tion sessions.51
The section 164(e) process lasted for three consecutive days
and concluded with no agreement among the parties.52  The
EPA’s approach to the process did not appear to aid the parties
in working toward a mutually acceptable resolution;53 the
Agency likely saw the section 164(e) process only as a procedural
step toward permit approval.  The tight timeline and limited rep-
resentation in the process reduced the opportunity for meaning-
ful discussion and exploration of the issues.  Timothy J. Sullivan,
who interviewed participants in this process and reviewed the ne-
gotiation transcripts, concluded, “Although the EPA managed
the negotiations and fulfilled its legal requirements, the rigidity
of the format and the narrowness of the agenda prevented the
disputing parties from reaching a settlement.”54
At the start of the session, the EPA’s representative asserted
the Agency’s intention to issue a PSD permit for the plant and
reminded participants that the EPA had the power to impose a
binding settlement if negotiations failed.55  According to a repre-
sentative of the Tribal Council, this preliminary statement “left
opponents of the plant in despair.”56  The Tribal Council had ex-
pected the negotiations to last over several meetings, and the
representative was not immediately prepared to negotiate sub-
stantive permit provisions.57  The EPA denied the Tribe’s request
for a delay and proceeded with a process that closely resembled a
49 Id.
50 SULLIVAN, supra  note 22, at 67. R
51 The EPA was represented by Regional Administrator Roger Williams; the
Northern Cheyenne Tribal Council was represented by Phil Sunderland, a lawyer
from Washington, D.C.; and Montana Power was represented by Jack Peterson, a
lawyer from Butte, Montana. Id.  at 67.
52 Id.  at 66-72.
53 Id.  at 74.
54 Id.  at 68.
55 Id.  at 67.
56 Id.
57 Id.  at 67-68.
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formal hearing, including full transcription and lawyers present-
ing statements on behalf of their clients.58
Moreover, when critical questions arose about tribal religious
and cultural values that might be affected by air-quality degrada-
tion, the non-Indian tribal representatives struggled to provide
meaningful answers.59  Apparently believing that the section
164(e) process was just another technical meeting, members of
the Tribal Council did not attend and could not, therefore, be
consulted about these issues during the negotiation.60
The difference in the parties’ representation became even
more important on the second day when the discussion moved to
technical aspects of the PSD permit, and the EPA proposed four
permit conditions for the group’s consideration.61  The Montana
Power Company’s board chairman was present and agreed to
three of the four conditions.62  By contrast, the Tribal Council
charged its representative with pursuing a set of highly restrictive
permit conditions, which likely would have precluded the pro-
posed construction altogether, and gave him no authority to com-
promise this position.63  As Sullivan observed, “[H]is lack of
power to make concessions prevented him from matching Mon-
tana Power’s concessions.  This brought negotiations to an im-
passe.”64  The section 164(e) process concluded on September 7,
1979, after just three days.65
The EPA issued a PSD permit for Units 3 and 4 of the Colstrip
plant on September 11, 1979, almost immediately upon conclu-
sion of the 164(e) process.66  The Northern Cheyenne Tribal
Council then recognized that its initial position was untenable,
and the parties embarked on a new—and ultimately more suc-
cessful—round of negotiations under the provisions of the Mon-
tana State Siting Act.67  This law gives its implementing body, the
Montana Siting Board, broad authority to require a permittee to
provide compensation for the socioeconomic impacts of develop-
58 Id.  at 68.
59 See id.  at 68-69.
60 Id.  at 69.
61 Id.  at 71.
62 Id.
63 Id.  at 72.
64 Id.
65 See id.  at 67, 71-72.
66 Id.
67 Id.  at 73.
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ment, opening new topics for discussion among negotiators in sit-
ing disputes.68  The parties met in small negotiating sessions in
October and November of 1979 and again in April 1980.  When
the parties finally reached a settlement, the Northern Cheyenne
agreed to drop their legal challenges, and Montana Power agreed
to a number of conditions aimed at helping tribal members par-
ticipate in the development of, benefit from, and monitor the im-
pacts of the new power plants.69  Sullivan concluded that the
section 164(e) process failed in the Northern Cheyenne-Colstrip
case for a number of reasons:
• There was scant opportunity for the disputing parties to
understand one another’s interests.  The process began
with formal position statements and moved immediately to
technical issues, rather than exploring the factors underly-
ing each party’s position.
• The parties had unrealistic expectations of the purpose or
possible outcome of negotiations.  The Northern Cheyenne
Tribal Council, for example, was not prepared to move
from its initial position opposing any construction and
hoped to convince the EPA to include such strict permit
requirements that construction would be impossible.
• The negotiation process was unclear to the participants, so
some came unprepared for substantive negotiations.
• The formal, legalistic proceeding discouraged direct inter-
action between the principal disputants, focusing instead
on the lawyers advocating their positions.  Thus, “the
164(e) negotiations became a permit hearing rather than
true bargaining sessions.”  The EPA officials believed that
the PSD section mandate of the CAA limited their consid-
eration of issues and required a constrained approach.70
In the end, “the section 164(e) negotiations, although man-
dated by law, were negotiations in name only.”71  Nonetheless,
the issues raised and the interests shared during the section
164(e) process provided the starting point for the successful ne-
gotiations completed shortly thereafter as part of Montana’s sit-
ing-permit process.
Air-quality impacts from the Colstrip facility were again the
subject of a section 164(e) negotiation process in 2003, as is de-
scribed in the fourth case study below.72  The Northern Chey-
68 Id.
69 Id.
70 Id.  at 74-77.
71 Id.  at 77.
72 See  discussion infra  Part I.B.4.
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enne Tribal Council is the only Indian-reservation governing
body to invoke section 164(e) in relation to a PSD permit.73
2. Yavapai-Apache Redesignation (1996)
The Yavapai-Apache Reservation is located in the Verde Val-
ley, about ninety miles north of Phoenix, Arizona.  It includes
five land parcels, ranging from almost 4 to 458 acres over a range
of thirty miles, for a total area of about 635 acres.  The Verde
Valley is in the heart of Arizona’s redrock country and encom-
passes landmarks such as Sedona, Oak Creek Canyon, and the
Sycamore Canyon Wilderness Area, which is a mandatory Class I
area under the CAA’s PSD program.74  The Reservation abuts
several national monuments of historic and archaeological
significance.75
In December 1993, the Yavapai-Apache Tribal Council submit-
ted a request to the EPA to redesignate the Yavapai-Apache
Reservation from Class II to Class I.76  According to the plan’s
supporting documents, “[t]he Yavapai-Apache Tribe desires to
maintain high quality air standards for its citizens,”77 and one of
the motivations for this additional protection was the Phoenix
Cement Plant’s plan to incinerate used tires near the Reserva-
tion.78  The EPA reviewed the request and preliminarily deter-
mined that it met the applicable procedural requirements.79  On
April 18, 1994, the EPA published a notice in the Federal Regis-
ter proposing to approve the request and announcing a thirty-day
period for public comment.80
The town of Clarkdale, located near one of the Reservation
parcels, requested a public hearing on the proposal, which the
EPA held on June 22, 1994.81  Subsequently, the EPA extended
the public-comment deadline to August 22, 1994.82  In a one-page
letter dated the final day of the comment period, the Governor
73 See  case studies in this article.
74 Redesignation of the Yavapai-Apache Reservation to a PSD Class I Area; Dis-
pute Resolution, 61 Fed. Reg. 56,450, 56,452 (Nov. 1, 1996).
75 See id.
76 Id.
77 Id.
78 See Arizona v. EPA, 151 F.3d 1205, 1209 (9th Cir. 1998).
79 Redesignation of the Yavapai-Apache Reservation to a PSD Class I Area; Dis-
pute Resolution, 61 Fed. Reg. at 56,452.
80 Id.
81 Id.
82 Id.
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of Arizona requested dispute resolution pursuant to CAA sec-
tion 164(e), expressing concern that “[t]he effects of the pro-
posed redesignation are not apparent to all of the stakeholders,
and confusion exists about the potential impacts of the Agency’s
proposed action.”83  In response, the EPA asked the State to
elaborate on its concerns and offered to meet with state officials
to address the need for better public understanding of the impli-
cations of redesignation.84
Governor Symington then wrote to the EPA on December 5,
1994, “The purpose of invoking the dispute resolution is to raise
the issues of whether the Yavapai-Apache Reservation is of suffi-
cient size to allow effective air quality management or have air
quality-related values.”85  The Reservation’s small, scattered par-
cels, he argued, meant that “it would be neither realistic nor
practicable” to apply those requirements to all Reservation lands
while distinguishing those lands from surrounding Class II areas,
which would be subject to different air-quality limitations.86
The section 164(e) process ran from October 1994 through Jan-
uary 1995.87  Initially, the EPA met separately with state and tri-
bal representatives to allow each to express its concerns in a non-
adversarial setting; then the two parties met without EPA offi-
cials.88  Subsequently, the parties met jointly with the EPA.89
The parties’ positions, as expressed in the meeting transcripts,
are summarized below from the EPA’s record of the dispute-res-
olution process:
• The State of Arizona argued that the extra-territorial ef-
fects of the redesignation would be unfair to non-reserva-
tion communities because it would “have significant
impacts on future growth and growth trends, business
trends, job opportunities in the Verde Valley, and in a way
which may or may not impact the ability to manage the
area for air quality values or to effectively manage the area
for air quality purposes.”90
• Arizona further argued that managing the scattered reser-
vation lands under a higher air-quality standard than sur-
83 Id.
84 Id.
85 Id.
86 Id.
87 Id.  at 56,452-53.
88 Id.
89 Id.
90 Id.
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rounding lands would “be a very untenable and
unworkable arrangement.”91
• The Yavapai-Apache Indian Tribe argued that the redesig-
nation was an appropriate means to protect the health and
welfare of its members.92
• Moreover, the Yavapai-Apache Indian Tribe expressed
frustration at the State’s late entry into the process, its de-
lay in providing a full statement of its opposition, and its
further delay in agreeing to attend the dispute resolution
proceedings.93
After hearing the parties’ concerns, the EPA attempted to ex-
plore common ground for a resolution, but the EPA adjourned
the meeting when neither party expressed an interest in further
discussion.94  The EPA subsequently encouraged the parties to
meet again to resolve the dispute, but they declined.95  There-
fore, on November 1, 1996, the EPA issued a final rule approving
the Yavapai-Apache redesignation to Class I.96
The EPA issued a lengthy analysis of the scope of its discretion
under section 164(e) as part of the record of the dispute-resolu-
tion process.97  The Agency claimed its decision was consistent
with the legislative and administrative histories of section 164(e),
which “indicate that so long as the prescribed procedures for
public input and involvement are followed, EPA is to give States
and Tribes broad latitude in deciding what PSD classification is
appropriate for lands within their respective jurisdictions.”98  The
EPA stated that major off-reservation effects of redesignation
appeared unlikely since the Verde Valley already has several
mandatory Class I areas receiving enhanced air-quality protec-
tion.  Regardless,
if there are any actual permit controversies that result from
Class I redesignation, at that juncture there will be concrete
facts and particularized, focused issues that are better fit for
resolution than more general allegations and objections.  EPA
is committed to working with the State and Tribe to resolve
91 Id.
92 Id.
93 Id.  at 56,453-54.
94 Id.  at 56,454.
95 Id.
96 40 C.F.R. § 52.150 (2006).
97 Redesignation of the Yavapai-Apache Reservation to a PSD Class I Area; Dis-
pute Resolution, 61 Fed. Reg. at 56,454-55.
98 Id.  at 56,454.
\\server05\productn\O\OEL\21-1\OEL101.txt unknown Seq: 16 10-JAN-07 11:11
16 J. ENVTL. LAW AND LITIGATION [Vol. 21, 1
any intergovernmental permit disputes that actually arise as a
result of the Class I redesignation.99
As in the Northern Cheyenne decision described above, the
EPA “noted that its review role was confined to determining
whether the tribe complied with the CAA’s procedural require-
ments, and declined to reweigh or second-guess the tribe’s im-
pact analysis.”100  Arizona’s subsequent challenge in federal
court upheld the EPA’s redesignation ruling, although the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the Agency on its use of a
federal implementation plan rather than a tribal implementation
plan.101  The court remanded the decision to the EPA for new
rulemaking,102 which has not yet been completed.  Doug McDan-
iel of EPA’s Region 9 identified two reasons why the case re-
mains unresolved: (1) both EPA and tribal staff have changed, so
no one originally involved in the redesignation is pushing it; and
(2) the cement plant adjacent to the Reservation cancelled its
plans to burn tires, so there is no immediate threat to Reserva-
tion air quality.103
In the Yavapai-Apache case, it appears the EPA made serious
efforts to encourage a fruitful negotiation process by meeting in-
dividually with the parties beforehand, asking for help under-
standing their positions, and encouraging follow-up meetings
after the formal negotiation hearing.104  Nonetheless, the section
164(e) process failed to resolve the significant differences be-
tween the parties, and the EPA again had to make a final deter-
mination to resolve the dispute.105  The EPA seems to have
viewed the State’s objections with skepticism and possibly saw
the Governor’s decision to invoke section 164(e) as little more
than a delay tactic to prevent redesignation from going for-
ward.106  Certainly the Yavapai-Apache Tribal Council believed
as much, as evidenced by their comments during the negotia-
99 Id.  at 56,455.
100 James M. Grijalva, Where Are the Tribal Water Quality Standards and
TMDLs?  18 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T 63, 64 (Fall, 2003).
101 Arizona v. EPA, 151 F.3d 1205, 1212 (9th Cir. 1998).
102 Id.
103 Telephone interview with Doug McDaniel, Tribal Air Program Coordinator,
EPA Region 9 (April 28, 2004).
104 See  Redesignation of the Yavapai-Apache Reservation to a PSD Class I Area;
Dispute Resolution, 61 Fed. Reg. 56,450, 56,453 (Nov. 1, 1996).
105 See id.  at 56,450.
106 See id.  at 56,453.
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tion.107  Given this background, it is not clear that the EPA was
prepared to act as a neutral mediator between the parties or that
the parties viewed the EPA as impartial.
3. Forest County Potawatomi Community Redesignation (1999)
The Forest County Potawatomi (FCP) Community is located in
northeastern Wisconsin, not far from Michigan’s Upper Penin-
sula.  The Reservation covers about 12,000 acres, many of which
are forested and managed for timber harvest and recreation.108
Recently opened tribal enterprises such as casinos and resorts
have sharply increased employment opportunities, bringing both
rapid population growth and heightened concern for environ-
mental protection.109  In recent years, the Tribe protested a pro-
posed zinc mine five miles from the Reservation boundary near
Crandon, Wisconsin.110
To protect Reservation lands from such external threats, the
FCP Tribal Council submitted a proposal on February 14, 1995,
to the EPA to redesignate certain FCP lands from Class II to
Class I.111  The proposal included reservation lands that were
more than eighty acres in size, located in Forest County, and held
in trust for the FCP Tribe by the federal government.112  It also
included required technical reports and maps, as well as docu-
mentation of a public notification and a public hearing held the
previous September.113  As the EPA concluded in its notice of
proposed rulemaking on June 29, 1995, “the documentation sub-
mitted by the Tribal Council shows that all statutory and regula-
tory procedural requirements for redesignation have been
met.”114
The EPA proposed a public hearing for August 1995, but post-
poned the meeting after the governors of Michigan and Wiscon-
sin objected to the redesignation and requested formal dispute
resolution pursuant to section 164(e).115  Neither request letter
107 See id.
108 Kreye, supra  note 8, at 100. R
109 Notice of Class III Gaming Compact Taking Effect, 71 Fed. Reg. 5068 (Jan. 31,
2006).
110 Kreye, supra  note 8, at 105. R
111 Redesignation of the Forest County Potawatomi Community to a PSD Class I
Area, 60 Fed. Reg. 33,779-02, 33,780 (June 29, 1995).
112 Id.
113 Id.
114 Id.
115 Kreye, supra  note 8, at 103. R
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contained specific objections to the redesignation, but the gover-
nors spoke publicly about their concerns over the potential reach
of tribal air-quality regulation beyond Reservation boundaries.116
Wisconsin Governor Tommy Thompson’s spokesman claimed
that the FCP Tribe’s proposal would “devastate the economy of
northern Wisconsin”; similarly, Michigan Governor John Engler
argued that the redesignation would hinder economic develop-
ment in the Upper Peninsula.117 Further, both states signed on as
amici curiae in Arizona’s lawsuit challenging the Yavapai-
Apache redesignation, supporting Arizona’s position that small,
scattered reservation lands are inappropriate for redesignation to
Class I status.118
In 1995, the EPA contracted with a professional mediation
firm to conduct the section 164(e) negotiations.119  According to
a representative of the State of Wisconsin, hiring a third-party
mediator was essential: “[Wisconsin’s] main concern has always
been with EPA and not directly with the Tribe.  The State does
not agree with the Class I procedural requirements and disagrees
with EPA’s ‘rubber stamping’ approval process.”120  Michigan
chose to not participate in the section 164(e) negotiation, al-
though state representatives observed the initial session.121
After initial meetings with the mediator in 1997, the three par-
ties (the EPA, the FCP Tribe, and the State) met from September
1998 until reaching an agreement on February 2, 1999.122  Rather
than proceeding as a formal hearing, the negotiations en-
couraged face-to-face dialogue and used small breakout sessions
and regular information exchanges to help the parties better un-
derstand each other’s concerns.123
The discussions were successful, and the parties signed a Nego-
tiations Concept and Agreement in Principle on February 3,
116 Id.
117 Id.  at 87.
118 Arizona v. EPA, 151 F.3d 1205, 1207 (9th Cir. 1998).
119 Kreye, supra  note 8, at 103. See also  Ryan Tracey-Mooney, Tribal Environ- R
mental Regulation: Assertions of Sovereignty and Political Responses: A Case Study
of the Forest County Potawatomi Airshed Redesignation Proposal 25 (May 2000)
(unpublished Honors B.A. thesis, University of Chicago), available at  http://environ-
ment.uchicago.edu/studies/thesis/papers/ryan.pdf.
120 Telephone Interview by Maureen Hartmann with Martin Burkholder, Tribal
Specialist, Wisc. Dep’t of Natural Res., Div. of Air & Water (July 14, 2003).
121 Tracey-Mooney, supra  note 119, at 25. R
122 Id.
123 Martin Burkholder, supra  note 120. R
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1999.124  In the resulting agreement, Wisconsin agreed to not
challenge the EPA’s approval of the FCP reservation’s redesigna-
tion to Class I.125  In exchange, the Tribe made certain conces-
sions, including an agreement to limit enforcement of Class I air-
quality increments to major sources within ten miles of the Res-
ervation.126  The parties’ agreement incorporates an ongoing dis-
pute-resolution process using a Scientific Review Panel with
representatives from the State and Tribe.127  In addition, the par-
ties agreed to discuss disputed legal and policy issues and to try,
in good faith, to resolve them on a government-to-government
basis prior to requesting a section 164(e) review.128
Since Michigan did not participate in the dispute-resolution
process, it could still oppose the FCP redesignation.  The case
remains in “pre-decisional” status.129
4. Northern Cheyenne-Roundup PSD Permit (2003)130
As described above, the Northern Cheyenne Tribal Council
successfully sought redesignation of reservation lands to Class I
in 1977.131  In 1979, the EPA issued a conditional permit to Mon-
tana Power for the construction and operation of two coal-fired,
electricity-generating plants at Colstrip, Montana (Units 3 and
4), about fifteen miles north of the Northern Cheyenne Indian
Reservation.132  In 1999, PPL Montana succeeded Montana
Power as the owner and operator of Colstrip Units 3 and 4.133
The earlier EPA permit remained in force, but the State of Mon-
tana exercised PSD permitting authority for all air-contaminant
124 Tracey-Mooney, supra  note 119, at 49 (providing a reference list which indi- R
cates the date this agreement was signed).  For a detailed summary of the agreement
provisions, see id.  at 26-30.
125 Id.  at 29.
126 Id.  at 26, 29.
127 Id.  at 28.
128 Id.  at 28-29.
129 Id.  at 29-30.
130 Agreement Concerning Northern Cheyenne-Roundup PSD Permit, Northern
Cheyenne Indian Tribe, Mont. Dep’t of Envtl. Quality & Envtl. Prot. Agency (Feb.
13, 2004 (State of Montana), Feb. 27, 2004 (EPA), Apr. 22, 2004 (Northern
Cheyenne Tribal Council)) (on file with the authors) [hereinafter Final Agreement].
131 See supra  text accompanying notes 36-43. R
132 Final Agreement, supra  note 130, at 1. R
133 PPL Corporation, PP&L Global and Montana Power Company Finalize
PP&L’s Acquisition of Generation Assets in Montana , Dec. 17, 1999, http://
www.pplweb.com/newsroom/newsroom+quick+links/archived–ews/1999/ December/
12_17_1999_1.htm.
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sources in the state outside of Indian reservations.134  Subsequent
to the issuance of the EPA permit, the State of Montana issued
several preconstruction permits and also the operating permit for
the Colstrip facility.135
On January 14, 2002, Bull Mountain Development Company
No. 1 submitted an application to the Montana Department of
Environmental Quality (DEQ) for an air-quality permit for two
390-megawatt pulverized-coal-fired, electricity-generating plants
to be constructed near Roundup, Montana, about eighty miles
northwest of the Northern Cheyenne Reservation.136  The DEQ
issued a draft environmental-impact statement for the project in
November 2002, and a final environmental-impact statement in
January 2003.137
The Northern Cheyenne Tribal Council wrote to the EPA on
January 24, 2003, requesting that the Agency invoke its authority
under section 164(e) to resolve the Tribe’s concerns about the
project’s air-quality impacts.138  Specifically, the Tribal Council
expressed three concerns: (1) projected violations of Class I in-
crements, including existing violations at the Colstrip facility; (2)
visibility impacts; and (3) the cumulative effect of reasonably
foreseeable future development.139
On January 31, 2003, the DEQ issued an air-quality permit for
the Roundup Project, contending that PPL Montana had demon-
strated the project would comply with applicable air-quality re-
quirements.140  The Tribal Council disputed the DEQ’s
conclusion and argued that the project would contribute to viola-
tions of the Reservation’s air quality and visibility.141  The Mon-
tana Board of Environmental Review upheld the state air-quality
permit on June 6, 2003, prompting two environmental organiza-
tions to file a lawsuit on June 9, 2003.142
Meanwhile, in response to the request for a section 164(e) pro-
cess, the EPA retained the University of Montana’s Public Policy
134 Final Agreement, supra  note 130, at 1. R
135 Id.
136 Id.  at 1-2.
137 Id.  at 2-3.
138 Id.  at 3.
139 Id.
140 Id.
141 Id.
142 Jennifer McKee, Suit Targets Permits for Power Plant , BILLINGS GAZETTE,
June 12, 2003, available at  http://www.billingsgazette.net/articles/2003/06/ 12/local/
export109906.txt at B1.
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Research Institute to facilitate discussions between the govern-
ment parties.143  The permit applicant (PPL Montana) and the
two environmental groups that filed the permit challenge in-
quired about participating in the process, but the EPA responded
that they “envision[ed] the process as involving government-to-
government negotiations only, which is what section 164(e) of
the Act appears to contemplate.”144
The Public Policy Research Institute conducted a conflict as-
sessment in June 2003, and summarized the parties’ interests,
possible outcomes, and proposed next steps in a memo shared
with the Northern Cheyenne Tribe, the EPA, and the Montana
DEQ.145  Representatives of these government bodies first met
in Billings, Montana, on July 23, 2003.146  They subsequently
agreed to a work plan and ground rules for negotiations which
proposed that the section 164(e) negotiations would seek agree-
ment on the following two specific issues: (1) standing violators
of increments for sulfur dioxide and nitrogen dioxide in the Class
I airshed over the Reservation, and (2) the degree to which incre-
ments for sulfur dioxide and nitrogen dioxide would be further
violated by the proposed Roundup Power Plant in the Class I
143 Direct observation by the mediator, Matthew McKinney.
144 Letter from Richard R. Long, Director, EPA Air and Radiation Program, to
Steven T. Wade, Attorney, Browning, Kaleczyc, Berry & Hoven (May 29, 2003) (on
file with the authors).
145 The objective of a conflict assessment, sometimes referred to as “situation as-
sessment,” is to develop a common understanding of the problem’s substance, the
needs and interests of the parties, and the risks associated with different procedures
for resolving the issues. See  Lawrence Susskind & Jennifer Thomas-Larmer, Con-
ducting a Conflict Assessment , in THE CONSENSUS BUILDING HANDBOOK 101, 104
(Lawrence Susskind et al. eds., 1999); see also MCKINNEY & HARMON, supra  note 1, R
at 261.  A situation assessment does not limit other dispute-resolution or agreement-
building processes from moving forward. See id.  at 261. In this case, the Public
Policy Research Institute reviewed appropriate documents and interviewed people
representing different viewpoints.  Matthew McKinney, Summary of Conflict As-
sessment on Regional Air Quality, Northern Cheyenne Indian Reservation 1 (July 2,
2003) (on file with the authors).  Based on this information, the Public Policy Re-
search Institute prepared a short report summarizing the various parties’ interests
and concerns and their options for a negotiation process. Id.  The report was distrib-
uted to all of the interviewees for review and comment, and served as a “convening”
report for the first meeting.  Based on the convening report and the first meeting,
the participants jointly designed a negotiation process—consistent with their joint
understanding of section 164(e)—to meet their specific needs and interests. Id.
146 Final Agreement, supra  note 130, at 3. R
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airshed over the Reservation.147  The parties agreed to meet at
least monthly and to seek resolution of the issues by December
2003.148
During the next five months the participants engaged in nu-
merous conference calls rather than face-to-face meetings for
two reasons.  First, given that participants were geographically
dispersed from Denver (EPA regional office) to Seattle (North-
ern Cheyenne Tribe’s attorney), Helena (Montana offices of the
DEQ and the EPA) to Lame Deer, Montana (Northern Chey-
enne Tribe), it was very expensive to meet in person.149  Second,
like many complex multiparty negotiations, the participants
needed to move slowly, building a common understanding of the
nature of the problems, exploring alternative solutions, and dis-
cussing the feasibility of alternative solutions with their constitu-
ents.150  Negotiations of this type are often best conducted in a
series of two to four sessions, rather than full-day or multi-day
sessions.
In addition to the conference calls, the participants did meet
face-to-face two more times, once in Billings and once in Den-
ver.151  The mediator also stayed in frequent contact with the
parties, helping to clarify issues, interests, options, and potential
packages.152
As the discussions progressed, it became clear that the Tribe
wanted new permit conditions placed on the operations of Col-
strip Units 3 and 4, the subject of the 1979 section 164(e) negotia-
tion, raising issues about the scope of the present section 164(e)
process.153  An EPA attorney notified the parties that the EPA’s
authority extended only to the Roundup permit and did not al-
low the Agency to compel PPL Montana to make changes in its
Colstrip operations.154  The EPA’s limited authority would have
restricted its options to resolve the dispute if the section 164(e)
147 Clean Air Act 164(e) Negotiation, Northern Cheyenne Indian Reservation,
Suggested Work Plan and Ground Rules (Draft of July 10, 2003) (on file with the
authors) [hereinafter Negotiation Work Plan].
148 Id.  at 1.
149 Direct observation by the mediator, Matthew McKinney.
150 For illustrations of the various ways in which these processes unfold, see the
case studies of multiparty negotiations in THE CONSENSUS BUILDING HANDBOOK,
supra  note 145, at 685-1050. R
151 Direct observation by the mediator, Matthew McKinney.
152 Id.
153 Id.
154 Id.
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process did not result in an agreement between the parties, but it
did not prevent the State and the Tribe from exploring conditions
to which they could agree beyond the scope of the EPA’s deci-
sion-making authority.155  In the end, the opportunity for
broader discussions opened the door to successful negotiations.
The section 164(e) negotiation concluded with an agreement
signed by the State on February 13, 2004, by the EPA on Febru-
ary 27, 2004, and by the Tribal Council on April 22, 2004.156  The
EPA’s regional administrator signed the agreement as a “non-
party,” noting that the EPA recognized the agreement and in-
tended to participate in certain activities under it.157
The parties agreed to a number of conditions aimed at ensur-
ing compliance with Class I increments on the Reservation, in-
cluding permit conditions imposed on the existing Colstrip Units
3 and 4, as well as monitoring and evaluation of actions needed
to deal with visibility impacts.158  The agreement further commit-
ted the parties to resolve disputes cooperatively before resorting
to legal challenges:
Any dispute which arises under this Agreement shall in the
first instance be the subject of informal negotiations between
the Parties.  The period for informal negotiations shall not ex-
ceed twenty (20) working days from the time the dispute
arises, unless such period is modified by written agreement of
the Parties.  The dispute shall be considered to have arisen
when one Party sends the other Party a written Notice of Dis-
pute.  The dispute notice shall set forth the specific points of
the dispute, the basis for objection of the disputing Party, and
any matters or other information which the disputing Party
considers necessary or appropriate.  Either Party may request
the assistance of an impartial mediator to help resolve the dis-
pute, and the selection of a mediator will be made jointly by
the Parties.159
Five participants responded to a “participant satisfaction
scorecard” distributed by the Public Policy Research Institute at
the conclusion of the section 164(e) negotiation.160  Most con-
cluded that the negotiation was more costly and time-consuming
than alternative options, which they defined as either negotiating
155 Id.
156 Based on personal knowledge of the mediator, Matthew McKinney.
157 Final Agreement, supra  note 130, at 17. R
158 Id.  at 7-9.
159 Id.  at 10-11.
160 Confidential information on file with the mediator, Matthew McKinney.
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outside of the 164(e) process or doing nothing.161  All agreed
that, generally speaking, a collaborative approach was appropri-
ate to the situation, and they would recommend such an ap-
proach in the future.162  A recurring observation was that
intergovernmental conflicts persisting beyond the end of the ne-
gotiation threatened the agreement’s integrity.163  Apparently,
not all parties felt the EPA was fully committed to the negotia-
tion process or supported the agreement reached by the State
and the Tribe at the conclusion of the process.164
II
LESSONS LEARNED FROM SECTION 164(E)
NEGOTIATIONS
Although each application of section 164(e) is based on a
unique factual situation, some points of comparison provide in-
sight into the reasons why some negotiations have proved more
fruitful than others.  Based on the limited experience to date, we
propose the following elements for successful section 164(e)
negotiations.
A. Use the Process to Supplement Other Legal Proceedings
Negotiation and collaboration are often viewed as replace-
ments for the legal process or requirements for public participa-
tion.  To the contrary, negotiation and collaboration are intended
to increase the effectiveness of public participation and the legal
process.  They are designed to supplement and complement the
formal decision-making process.
As demonstrated in the four cases above, section 164(e) nego-
tiations do not require any party to surrender legal rights as a
condition of participation.  Negotiation creates a better forum for
disputants to explore and understand each other’s interests than
more formal, rigid, legal proceedings (and most public participa-
tion processes as well).  Negotiation and collaboration are very
flexible procedures and are most effective when adapted—con-
sistently with existing laws, policies, and regulations—to meet
the unique needs and interests of people in particular situations.
Mandatory negotiation simply requires a good-faith effort at
161 Id.
162 Id.
163 Id.
164 Id.
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resolving differences before resorting to unilateral decisions by
an administrative agency, to litigation, or to other means of mak-
ing decisions and resolving disputes.165
B. Clarify the EPA’s Roles
Section 164(e) places the EPA in an awkward position, as the
Agency is both a government agency with final decision-making
authority and the convener of disputing parties.166  As a regula-
tory authority, the EPA is concerned with implementing the
CAA and will necessarily bring enforcement concerns to the ne-
gotiating table.  In addition, the federal government has a special
relationship as a trustee for Indian tribes.167  As such, a federal
agency attempting to act as a neutral facilitator between states
and tribes likely faces questions about its impartiality or conflict-
ing loyalties.
In both the original Colstrip permit case and the Yavapai-
Apache redesignation case, the EPA ran the negotiations itself.
In the Colstrip case, the EPA convened a formal hearing and pre-
sided over the parties, one of which was the EPA itself.168  At the
outset, the EPA set the parameters of the discussion, most impor-
tantly by stating that the permit issuance to which the Tribe ob-
jected was not in question.169  There was no mediation, but
merely an opportunity to provide input into an essentially com-
pleted decision.
In the Yavapai-Apache case, the EPA worked more diligently
to assess the parties’ interests, meeting separately with the State
and the Tribe.170  In the end, however, the Agency held a formal
meeting at which all comments were transcribed.171  When the
parties were unable to resolve their disputes, the EPA exercised
its authority under section 164(e) to make a final decision.172
This approach resembles a model of dispute resolution known as
“med-arb,” in which the mediator serves as arbitrator if media-
165 For a recent review of the degree to which negotiation and collaboration are
being integrated into natural-resource decision-making, see generally MCKINNEY &
HARMON, supra  note 1. R
166 42 U.S.C. § 7474(e) (2006).
167 See  Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pct.) 1, 17-18 (1831).
168 SULLIVAN, supra  note 22, at 66-67. R
169 Id.  at 67.
170 See  Redesignation of the Yavapai-Apache Reservation to a PSD Class I Area;
Dispute Resolution, 61 Fed. Reg. 56,450, 56,453 (Nov. 1, 1996).
171 Id.
172 Id.
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tion fails.173  The authors of a leading book on the subject, Get-
ting Disputes Resolved , conclude that this model has both
advantages and disadvantages, including the possibility that
“[w]hat appears to be a negotiated resolution may be perceived
by the parties as an imposed one. . . . Moreover, because the
parties know that the neutral may decide the dispute, they may
withhold information that would be useful in reaching a medi-
ated settlement.”174  Some parties in the Yavapai-Apache case
indicated distrust of the EPA’s ability to act as a neutral third
party and, therefore, likely did not fully share information during
the advance meetings.175
By contrast, in the more recent applications of section
164(e)—the FCP redesignation case and the Roundup permit
case—the EPA chose to hire a professional mediator to provide
neutral third-party facilitation.176  The mediator met or spoke
with the parties separately to assess their interests and concerns,
while the EPA’s role in the group discussions might be described
as that of “interested observer,” providing technical input, per-
spective on regulatory options, and clarifications of legal ques-
tions.177  Both cases resulted in satisfactory agreements, so the
EPA did not have to resort to making a final “resolution” deci-
sion, and the parties appeared to have been satisfied with the
service provided by the mediators.178
Perhaps the EPA should view its role as a catalyst for dispute
resolution rather than as an agent for resolving the dispute—ac-
knowledging, of course, that the Agency is charged to act as arbi-
ter if negotiations fail.  Thus, when section 164(e) requires the
EPA to step into a PSD dispute, the Agency should initiate the
best possible dispute-resolution process with a professional medi-
ator, identify the appropriate parties and encourage their full
participation, participate with meaningful communications and
information sharing, and contribute technical and legal expertise
as needed throughout the process.  Of course, the EPA should
173 W.L. URY et al., GETTING DISPUTES RESOLVED: DESIGNING SYSTEMS TO CUT
THE COSTS OF CONFLICT 66-57 (1988).
174 Id. See also ANN L. MACNAUGHTON & JAY G. MARTIN, ENVIRONMENTAL
DISPUTE RESOLUTION: AN ANTHOLOGY OF PRACTICAL SOLUTIONS 49-51 (2002)
(discussing the application of “med-arb” to environmental disputes).
175 Arizona Redesignation of the Yavapai-Apache Reservation to a PSD Class I
Area, 61 Fed. Reg. 56,461, 56,468-69 (Nov. 1, 1996) (codified at 40 C.F.R. § 52.150).
176 See supra  text accompanying notes 119 and 143. R
177 Id.
178 Id.
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also play the role of final decision-maker, particularly when the
negotiation process fails to provide a mutually satisfying result.
C. Provide an Efficient, Structured Process
Congress provided the EPA with no guidance for the process it
should use to “enter into negotiations with the parties involved
to resolve . . . dispute[s].”179  Thus, each case has demonstrated a
different approach, from the short and formal to (in the latter
cases) longer, more complex processes involving informal
conversations.
For example, the 1979 Colstrip case lasted just three days and
involved no informal dialogue or discussion.180  Parties communi-
cating through their lawyers in a formal hearing such as that one
will emphasize their positions rather than share their interests
and work toward mutually satisfactory solutions.  The Yavapai-
Apache case extended over a longer period and included infor-
mal meetings to explore the parties’ concerns but ended with a
short, formal meeting.181  The long time-frame was not the result
of ongoing negotiations, but instead appears to have been caused
by the parties’ reluctance to communicate with one another.
The FCP-redesignation and Roundup-permit cases demon-
strate that a section 164(e) negotiation need not extend over a
long period to be successful.  Neither lasted more than six
months.182  In the Roundup case, the parties acknowledged at
the outset the need for a timely resolution to ensure influence
over the state permitting process, and they set a target settlement
date of December 2003.183  This goal required tightly scheduled
meetings and many telephone-conference calls, but the parties
responded favorably to the deadline and accomplished their ne-
gotiations within the agreed-upon period.184
A clearly structured process is a necessary condition for any
successful multiparty negotiation.  While each process must be
tailored to the particular parties’ unique needs and interests,
scholars, through study and experience, have articulated a set of
179 42 U.S.C. § 7474(e) (2006).
180 SULLIVAN, supra  note 22, at 66-72. R
181 Redesignation of the Yavapai-Apache Reservation to a PSD Class I Area; Dis-
pute Resolution, 61 Fed. Reg. at 56,454.
182 See supra  text accompanying notes 122, 146-156. R
183 See  Negotiation Work Plan, supra  note 147, at 1. R
184 Direct observation of the mediator, Matthew McKinney.
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“best practices” to design effective processes.185  Two key ele-
ments in designing an effective process are (1) getting the right
people to the table, and (2) creating an interest-based agenda.
1. Get the Right People to the Table
Just who should participate in a section 164(e) negotiation pro-
cess is an unresolved question.  In the 1979 Colstrip case, one of
the negotiating parties was the permit applicant, which was rep-
resented for at least part of the hearing by its board chairman.186
However, the EPA has restricted participation in the other cases
to government entities, despite the acknowledged impacts that
decisions have on regulated industries and other interests. In the
2003 Roundup case, for example, several affected parties in-
quired about participating in the section 164(e) process but were
denied the opportunity.187  Their participation might have con-
tributed valuable technical information or helped shape the
terms of the agreement.  Interested parties excluded from a ne-
gotiation process also will have no stake in the success of a nego-
tiated agreement and may seek to discredit it or challenge it in
another forum.  In such a situation, the parties to the agreement
will ultimately find their progress toward a long-term solution to
their dispute obstructed.
Additionally, failure to participate in negotiations may com-
promise the interested parties’ ability to challenge the final
agreement or the EPA resolution in court.  For example, the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that the Arizona Chamber
of Commerce had no standing to challenge the Yavapai-Apache
redesignation because “the Chamber did not participate in either
the EPA redesignation proceedings or the dispute-resolution
proceedings.”188
Acknowledging the potential difficulty of exclusion, the parties
to the 2003 Roundup negotiation agreed at the beginning of the
process “to keep other potentially affected parties, including
power plant owners and operators and environmental groups, in-
formed of the direction of the negotiation and to seek their input
185 Lawrence Susskind, An Alternative to Robert’s Rules of Order for Groups, Or-
ganization, and Ad Hoc Assemblies that Want to Operate By Consensus , in THE
CONSENSUS BUILDING HANDBOOK, supra  note 145, at 3-57. R
186 SULLIVAN, supra  note 22, at 67. R
187 Based on personal knowledge of the mediator, Matthew McKinney.
188 Arizona v. EPA, 151 F.3d 1205, 1210 (9th Cir. 1998).
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and advice as appropriate.”189  The participants did this in a very
informal, sporadic way, and it remains to be seen if any other
“stakeholders” will challenge the process and its outcomes.
Finally, it clearly matters which representatives from the nego-
tiating parties participate in the process.  The 1979 Colstrip case
demonstrated the importance of communicating early with par-
ticipants to ensure they are informed, prepared, and appropri-
ately represented.  The process should also be sufficiently flexible
to permit recesses when representatives need to confer with their
constituencies for information and support.
Unlike the earlier Colstrip negotiations, the parties to the 2003
Roundup negotiation drafted an early work plan that not only
included a list of stakeholder groups,190 but also stated that each
stakeholder group would include individuals with decision-mak-
ing authority, legal expertise, and technical expertise.191 By en-
suring that all stakeholders are adequately represented, such
procedures reflect the best practice.192
2. Create an Interest-Based Agenda
Section 164(e) provides both an opportunity for broad discus-
sion and a narrow scope of resolution.  The statute does not pre-
scribe the topics that parties may address in their negotiations,
nor the range of solutions that might be included in their agree-
ment, but it does limit the EPA’s discretion if the negotiations
fail and the Agency must resolve the dispute.193  Acknowledging
the uncertainty, in 1997 the EPA sought public input “on
whether EPA should address . . . some of the potential measures
and tools that may be employed to resolve intergovernmental
disputes and, if so, what approaches may be appropriate.”194
In the two cases in which negotiating parties failed to reach
agreement, the 1979 Colstrip case and the Yavapai-Apache case,
189 Negotiation Work Plan, supra  note 147, at 3. R
190 We define a “stakeholder” as any person or organization interested in or af-
fected by an issue, any decision-making body or institution needed to implement the
outcome of a dispute-resolution process, or any person or organization that may
challenge the process and/or its outcomes.
191 Negotiation Work Plan, supra  note 147, at 1-2. R
192 For specific strategies on getting the right people to the table, see SUSSKIND,
supra  note 185, at  38-39. R
193 42 U.S.C. § 7474(e) (2006).
194 Prevention of Significant Deterioration of Air Quality (PSD) Program: Permit
Review Procedures for Sources that May Adversely Affect Air Quality in Non-Fed-
eral Class I Areas, 62 Fed. Reg. 27,158, 27,165 (May 16, 1997).
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the EPA limited the parties’ discussions to the scope of the
Agency’s narrow, carefully constrained, ultimate decisions.195
This was unfortunate, because the objectors in both instances had
broader concerns than technical violations of PSD increments.
The Northern Cheyenne, for example, wanted to address socio-
economic impacts of the expanded Colstrip facilities, but these
were not on the table for discussion until the parties subse-
quently met to negotiate the state siting permit.196  Similarly, Ar-
izona’s invocation of section 164(e) likely was an attempt to draw
attention to the confusion and concerns of non-Indians in the
Verde Valley, some of whom believed the Tribe’s policies would
unfairly constrain economic development in their communi-
ties.197  The EPA was unable to address these concerns, except by
assuring the State they were speculative and would be addressed
more appropriately in the context of a PSD permit application.198
By contrast, the parties to the FCP-redesignation settlement
included provisions clarifying the procedures for reviewing PSD
permits in the future, offering more certainty than would other-
wise be available to potentially affected parties—although they
apparently had to convince the EPA that a broader scope of dis-
cussion was appropriate in section 164(e) negotiations.199  Fur-
ther, by agreeing to a dispute-resolution procedure, they reduced
the possibility that section 164(e) will be necessary to resolve fu-
ture permit disputes.200  Similarly, the successfully negotiated
resolution of the Roundup-permit dispute went beyond the scope
of the EPA’s authority and examined the Reservation’s air qual-
ity as a regional rather than a site-specific issue.201
These cases illustrate the importance of how parties frame and
view a section 164(e) process.  If the EPA presents the process as
a procedural step toward a final agency decision, then the scope
of issues that may be considered is necessarily narrow.  On the
other hand, when the EPA offers the negotiation process as a
forum for productive, creative solutions, the parties themselves
may reach far more satisfying results.
195 See  discussion accompanying notes 51-52, 93.
196 SULLIVAN, supra  note 22, at 68-73. R
197 Redesignation of the Yavapai-Apache Reservation to a PSD Class I Area; Dis-
pute Resolution, 61 Fed. Reg. 56,450, 56,456 (Nov. 1, 1996).
198 Id.  at 56,457.
199 Interview with Marty Burkholder, supra  note 120, on May 5, 2004. R
200 Tracey-Mooney, supra  note 119, at 28-29. R
201 Direct observation by the mediator, Matthew McKinney.
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III
THE PLACE OF MANDATORY DISPUTE RESOLUTION
Mandatory use of negotiation, mediation, arbitration, or some
other form of dispute resolution is not the only way to resolve
disputes that emerge in the context of federal natural-resources
and environmental law.  The variety of statutory models outlined
in such laws (summarized in Appendix 1) suggests the possibility
of a more comprehensive, robust system to prevent and resolve
disputes.  The models also clarify the place of mandatory dispute
resolution in such a system.202
In recent years, the field of dispute resolution has moved be-
yond the sporadic application of dispute-resolution procedures in
isolated cases.203  Those engaged in what is referred to as “dis-
pute resolution systems design” seek to create comprehensive
systems for dealing not with just a single dispute, but with the
stream of disputes that arises in nearly all relationships, commu-
nities, and institutions.204
In one of the leading texts in the field, Getting Disputes Re-
solved,  authors William Ury, Jeanne Brett, and Stephen
Goldberg identify three basic ways to resolve disputes: (1) recon-
cile the disputants’ underlying interests, (2) determine who is
right, and (3) determine who is more powerful.205  The “best”
approach to resolving a particular dispute can be determined by
considering the following four criteria:
1. How satisfied are the stakeholders likely to be with the
outcomes of a particular process?
2. What is the chance that the issue will be resolved—and
not recur—through one process or another?  That is, how
sustainable is the outcome likely to be?
3. What are the likely costs—time, money, and emotional
energy—of relying on one process rather than another?
4. How will the use of one process over another impact the
relationships among stakeholders?206
These four criteria are related.  Dissatisfaction with outcomes
may lead to the recurrence of disputes, straining relationships,
202 See Appendix 1 for a review of alternative statutory models to prevent and
resolve disputes.
203 See URY et al., supra  note 173, at 171. R
204 See id.
205 Id.  at 4-8.
206 Id.  at 11-19.
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and increasing transaction costs.207  Because these four different
costs typically increase or decrease together, it is useful to refer
to them collectively as “the costs of disputing.”
Based on these criteria, the core proposition of the theory of
dispute-systems design is that integrating interests through nego-
tiation, mediation, and consensus building is less costly than de-
termining who is right, which in turn is less costly than
determining who is more powerful.208  This does not mean that
focusing on interests is always better than resorting to rights or
power, but simply that such a focus tends to result in greater sat-
isfaction with outcomes, fewer dispute recurrences, lower trans-
action costs, and less strain on relationships.209
In light of this analytical framework, Getting Disputes Re-
solved  presents six principles of dispute-systems design: (1) put
the focus on interests; (2) build in “loop-back” procedures that
encourage disputants to return to negotiation; (3) provide low-
cost rights and power backup procedures; (4) build in consulta-
tion before, and feedback after; (5) arrange procedures in a low-
to-high cost sequence; and (6) provide the motivation, skills, and
resources necessary to make the procedures work.210
Using this theoretical framework, the existing statutory models
together provide the beginning of a more comprehensive “sys-
tem” to prevent and resolve disputes.  By combining the various
public-participation and dispute-resolution mechanisms into one
system embracing everything from consultation, consistency, and
unassisted negotiation to voluntary mediation, mandatory dis-
pute resolution, and agency recommendation, a more robust sys-
tem is possible.  The system would seek prevention of
unnecessary disputes by engaging people early and often
throughout the decision-making process.211  Many studies
demonstrate that a common understanding and broad-based
agreement are made possible by preventing needless disputes
207 Id.  at 12-13.
208 Id.  at 15.
209 Id.
210 Id.  at 42.
211 For good examples of how to do this, see International Association for Public
Participation, Core Values for the Practice of Public Participation, http://
www.iap2.org/displaycommon.cfm?an=4 (last visited August 21, 2006), and USFS
COMMITTEE OF SCIENTISTS, SUSTAINING THE PEOPLE’S LANDS: RECOMMENDATIONS
FOR STEWARDSHIP OF THE NATIONAL FORESTS AND GRASSLANDS INTO THE NEXT
CENTURY, 83-144 (1999), available at  http://www.fs.fed.us/emc/nfma/includes/cosre-
port/Committee%20of%20Scientists%20Report.htm.
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with meaningful opportunities for public participation early and
often throughout the process.212
However, the proposed dispute-resolution system would also
recognize that it may not be possible in some cases to resolve all
disputes; thus, it would be important to provide low-cost proce-
dures for dispute resolution as preludes to litigation and other
rights- and power-based procedures.  It is important to empha-
size that not all disputes related to federal natural-resources and
environmental law can, or should, be resolved by reconciling in-
terests.  But rights and power procedures often become the fo-
rums of first resort and are frequently used where they are not
necessary.  The goal in designing a more effective dispute-resolu-
tion system is to resolve most disputes by integrating interests,
some by determining who is right, and the fewest by determining
who is more powerful.
Such a system of dispute resolution would be mandatory in
two senses: (1) in requiring a certain step-by-step progression of
the process, and (2) in mandating the type of process.  First, par-
ties would be required to move through the system one step at a
time.  For example, the states of Montana and Wyoming incorpo-
rated a dispute-resolution system into the Yellowstone River
Compact in 1996.213  The dispute-resolution system addresses dis-
agreements over management of the interstate river by moving
from unassisted negotiation to facilitation before allowing the
states to employ voting and litigation.214
Second, in some cases mandating a certain type of dispute-res-
olution process might also be valuable, as in the CAA and the
Clean Water Act (CWA).  Given the growing use of courts to
strongly encourage, if not require, mediation and other forms of
dispute resolution short of litigation, we believe it is time to ex-
pand the use of mandated dispute resolution beyond its currently
limited sphere of application.  If the courts will insist that dispu-
tants engage in these alternative forms of dispute resolution, per-
haps now is the time to structure the processes in such a way that
212 For detailed insight into the role and value of public participation, see MCKIN-
NEY & HARMON, supra  note 1; THOMAS C. BEIERLE & JERRY CAYFORD, DEMOC- R
RACY IN PRACTICE: PUBLIC PARTICIPATION IN ENVIRONMENTAL DECISIONS (2002);
and JULIA WONDOLLECK & STEVEN L. YAFFEE, MAKING COLLABORATION WORK:
LESSONS FROM INNOVATION IN NATURAL RESOURCE MANAGEMENT (2000).
213 The Compact provides an institutional framework for managing the interstate
river. See MCKINNEY & HARMON, supra  note 1, at 243-44. R
214 Id.  at 244.
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not only empowers people to resolve their own differences, but
also addresses the concerns they may have with mandatory dis-
pute resolution.215
To illustrate how this system might be integrated into federal
natural-resources and environmental law, consider the possibility
of resource-management planning by the U.S. Bureau of Land
Management (BLM).  Table 1 describes how interest-based ap-
proaches hypothetically could be integrated into each step of the
planning process governed by the National Environmental Policy
Act of 1969 (NEPA).216
The voluntary-mediation option integrated into the decision-
making and dispute-resolution process of the Alberta Environ-
mental Appeals Board provides an apparently successful, real-
life example.217  The Board has conducted mediations on about
half of all appeals on file with a success rate of eighty-three per-
cent, although it notes that some cases are not appropriate for
mediation.218  The take-home lesson of the Alberta study is that
mediation can be offered as a voluntary, rather than a
mandatory, option; if it meets certain tests and is well run, media-
tion will be chosen most of the time.
Our approach to designing more effective dispute-resolution
systems for federal natural-resources and environmental law is
experimental.  While some work has been done on the merits of
institutionalizing alternative forms of dispute resolution in natu-
ral-resources and environmental policy,219 we believe there is a
215 For example, who will be allowed to initiate the process and under what cir-
cumstances?  Who will participate in the process?  Should negotiation sessions be
open to the public?  What is the status of information and proposals exchanged dur-
ing the dispute-resolution process?  What are the fallback procedures if the dispute-
resolution process fails?  How might mandatory dispute-resolution procedures influ-
ence the relative distribution of power?
216 National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 § 102, 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (2006).
217 MCKINNEY & HARMON, supra  note 1, at 241-42; See also  Matthew Taylor, R
Patrick Field, Lawrence Susskind, & William Tilleman, Using Mediation in Canadian
Environmental Tribunals: Opportunities and Best Practices , 22 DALHOUSIE L.J., 51,
61-62 (1999).
218 ENVTL. APPEALS BOARD, ALTA. (CAN.) DEP’T OF ENV’T & MINISTRY OF
ENV’T, 2003-04 ENVTL. APPEALS BOARD. ANN. REP. 21; See also MCKINNEY &
HARMON, supra  note 1, at 242. R
219 See, e.g. , GAIL BINGHAM, RESOLVING ENVIRONMENTAL DISPUTES: A DECADE
OF EXPERIENCE 149-50 (1986); see also  Jonathan Brock, Mandated Mediation: A
Contradiction in Terms , 14 VILL. ENVTL L.J. 57 (1991) (discussing the features of
successful institutionalized dispute-resolution systems); Matthew McKinney, Design-
ing a Dispute Resolution System for Water Policy and Management , NEGOT. J. 153,
160-61 (April 1992).
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tremendous need and value to promoting thinking and experi-
ments along these lines.  Noting the difficulty of specifying in ad-
vance which parties belong at a negotiation table and which
ground rules will foster productive work among various combina-
tions of parties, mediation expert Gail Bingham cautions that
“much remains to be learned about how to draft statutes that
specify general procedures for negotiation, mediation, or arbitra-
tion of environmental disputes.”220  Moreover, she notes, “It is
also not clear what effect establishing specific rules has on par-
ties’ incentives to negotiate in good faith or at all.”221  Jonathan
Brock concludes that “the design complexity, political contro-
versy, and intersection with existing regulatory and administra-
tive practices makes institutionalizing alternative dispute-
resolution mechanisms more difficult than using ADR to resolve
individual site-specific disputes.”222  We also suspect that there is
much to learn from international environmental law about the
place of mandatory dispute resolution in federal natural-re-
sources and environmental law.223
TABLE 1
INTEGRATING INTEREST-BASED STRATEGIES INTO BLM
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT-LEVEL
PLANNING EFFORTS
Key Steps Collaborative Strategies
Prepare to Plan • Consult an facilitator or mediator for coaching, training,
and/or team-building
• Conduct a situation or conflict assessment
• Design the right process, or a public-participation plan, in
consultation with citizens
• Include resources (time, money, and staff) in the project
plan and budgets to support the selected level of
participation
Analyze the Management • Jointly name the problem with citizens and
Situation stakeholders via one-on-one interviews, groups of like-
minded interests, and/or a multi-party group
• Foster mutual education by exchanging information
• Engage in joint fact-finding
220 BINGHAM, supra  note 219, at 53. R
221 Id.
222 Brock, supra  note 219, at 84. R
223 For a good start on this body of knowledge, see Alfred Rest, Enhanced Imple-
mentation of International Environmental Treaties by Judiciary—Access to Justice in
International Environmental Law for Individuals and NGOs: Efficacious Enforce-
ment by the Permanent Court of Arbitration , 1 MACQUARIE J. INT’L & COMPAR.
ENVTL. L. 1 (2004).
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Conduct Scoping • Publish a Notice of Intent and provide opportunity for
comment
• Gather public input and advice via public meetings, open
houses, web-based surveys, stakeholder meetings, and
existing social networks
• Convene a 21st century town meeting
• Validate public input and advice via newsletters, web
sites, letter to the editor
Develop Planning Criteria • Develop planning criteria in consultation with citizens and
stakeholders
• Use a single-negotiating text to facilitate the process
Formulate Alternatives • Jointly frame options or choices—either one-on-one, in
groups of like-minded interests, and/or a multi-party
group
• Encourage citizens and other stakeholders to develop and
submit their own alternatives
• Use stakeholders as a sounding board to ensure that the
range of alternatives responds to NEPA issues and
unresolved issues
Analyze Effects of • Use an independent fact-finder
Alternatives • Convene a technical advisory panel
• Engage in joint fact-finding
Select a Preferred • Use agreed-upon criteria to evaluate alternatives
Alternative • Negotiate—either unassisted or assisted (with facilitator
or mediator)
• Conduct a deliberative poll
• Convene a citizen jury or study circle
• The responsible official may consult stakeholders to
confirm the decision and rationale before announcing the
selected alternative
Prepare a Draft Resource • Make sure the process is open and transparent
Management Plan/ • Adopt a principle of “no surprises”
Environmental Impact
Statement (EIS)
Publish Draft Resource • Use multiple means to inform and educate people, and
Management Plan/EIS and to seek their input and advice
Provide 90-day Public
Comment Period
Prepare a Proposed • Convene a working group of diverse stakeholders to
Resource Management review public comments, clarify dominant themes,
Plan/Final EIS validate or revise NEPA issues, and explain the
30-day Protest Period and rationale for the final decision
60-day Governor’s • Resolve outstanding issues through negotiation, then
Consistency Review mediation, then arbitration
Prepare Record of Decision • Engage in a settlement conference, summary jury trial,
and Approved Resource or mini-trial during appeals (before litigating)
Management Plan
Implement, Monitor, and • Convene a working group to monitor and evaluate
Evaluate implementation, and to suggest appropriate changes to
the plan of action
• Create partnerships to implement on-the-ground projects
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APPENDIX 1:
ALTERNATIVE STATUTORY MODELS TO PREVENT AND
RESOLVE DISPUTES
A review of federal natural-resources and environmental laws
reveals three different models to prevent and resolve disputes.
A. Consultation
Some federal statutes require federal agencies to enter into
“consultation” with one another, and sometimes with states,
prior to making final decisions.  While the consultation is gener-
ally mandatory, the lead agency need not defer to the other agen-
cies or the states, and there is no mechanism to resolve identified
differences.  Nonetheless, this procedural requirement may serve
as an important opportunity for publicizing criticism and con-
cerns and often influences the lead agency’s final decision.  Ac-
cording to one commentator, “Consultation is designed to slow
down headlong rushes to complete ill-considered projects and to
provide an outside opinion on possible consequences for biologi-
cal resources.”224  The examples below illustrate the variety of
procedural formalities expressed in such consultation
requirements.
The Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act of 1934 requires that
any federal agency proposing a water impoundment or diversion
project (or any private party in need of a federal permit for such
a project) must, “with a view to the conservation of wildlife re-
sources by preventing loss of and damage to such resources as
well as providing for the development and improvement thereof
in connection with such water-resource development,” consult
with the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, the Department of the
Interior, and the appropriate state wildlife official.225  The lead
agency must “give full consideration” to reports and recommen-
dations received through this process, and must incorporate
“such justifiable means and measures for wildlife purposes” as
the agency determines are necessary “to obtain maximum overall
project benefits.”226
NEPA requires federal agencies to prepare an EIS prior to ap-
proving major federal actions that may significantly affect the en-
224 Robert L. Fischman, Predictions and Prescriptions for the Endangered Species
Act , 34 ENVTL. L. 451, 456 (2004).
225 16 U.S.C. § 662(a) (2006).
226 Id. § 662(b).
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vironment.227  The statute directs responsible federal officials,
prior to preparing the EIS, to “consult with and obtain the com-
ments of any Federal agency which has jurisdiction by law or spe-
cial expertise with respect to any environmental impact
involved,” and further requires that all comments received be
made available for public review and be included in all agency
review processes.228  According to one commentator, while the
EIS requirement “opened the floodgates for public participation
in all aspects of environmental policy,” the consultation mandate
is just beginning to be realized as more collaborative approaches
to policy development and implementation emerge from “the to-
tal policy gridlocks of the 1990s.”229  A recent report by the Na-
tional Environmental Conflict Resolution Advisory Committee
offers detailed recommendations for incorporating conflict-reso-
lution mechanisms into NEPA implementation.230
Despite compelling arguments as to contrary congressional in-
tent, courts have interpreted NEPA as essentially a procedural
statute, mandating consultation and public disclosure, but not en-
vironmentally benign decisions.231  Section 7 of the Endangered
Species Act of 1973 is the closest to such a mandate, requiring
agencies undertaking actions that may affect a listed or proposed
species to consult with Fish and Wildlife or the National Marine
Fisheries Service to determine how best to protect the affected
populations and their habitat.232  The consulting agency’s deter-
mination must be given substantial weight; the law prevents the
action from going forward if the agency determines that there
will be “jeopardy” to the listed species and that no reasonable or
prudent alternatives to the proposed actions are available.233
227 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C) (2006).
228 Id. § 4332(C)(v).
229 Margaret A. Shannon, Will NEPA be ‘An Agenda for the Future’ or will it
Become ‘A Requiem for the Past’?: A Book Review of the National Environmental
Policy Act: An Agenda for the Future , 8 BUFF. ENVTL. L.J. 143, 151 (2000).  See infra
Table 1, for  suggestions on more collaborative approaches to implementing NEPA.
230 U.S. INST. FOR ENVTL. CONFLICT RESOLUTION, ENVIRONMENTAL CONFLICT
RESOLUTION ADVISORY COMMITTEE REPORT 46 (2005), available at  www.ecr.gov/
necrac/reports.htm.
231 Id.  at 9, 26-27.
232 16 U.S.C. § 1536 (2006).
233 Id. § 1536(b)(3)(A).  Such determinations are exceedingly rare: a 1995 study
found that only 0.005% of a total of 100,000 consultations yielded jeopardy opinions
that halted federal actions. Jeffrey A. Lockwood, The Intent and Implementation of
the Endangered Species Act: A Matter of Scale , in PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE
ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT: SAVING HABITATS, PROTECTING HOMES 73, 73 (Jason
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This standard, argued one observer, “added a powerful, substan-
tive bite to the old resource management consultation proce-
dure.”234  Yet the time, expense, and conflicts engendered in this
process have prompted some to call for more cooperative alter-
natives, such as conservation agreements between private parties
and government agencies.235
B. Consistency
Several federal statutes encourage or direct agencies to ensure
that their decisions are “consistent” with state and local laws to
the extent practicable.  The extent to which these provisions
guide or control federal agency decisions varies depending on the
statute and the history of federal primacy over the particular re-
source at issue.
For example, the Federal Land Policy and Management Act of
1976 governs the public lands managed by the BLM.236  The stat-
ute directs the agency to ensure that resource-management plans
are as consistent as possible with existing officially adopted and
approved resource-related plans, policies, or programs of other
federal agencies, state agencies, Indian tribes and local govern-
ments,237 and to assist in resolving identified inconsistencies.238
A state governor who objects to a proposed resource-manage-
ment plan with such identified inconsistencies may appeal its ap-
proval within the BLM, but the agency has no obligation to
change its plans to address such issues.239  There also is no pro-
cess specified to resolve such disputes other than judicial review
of the administrative action in federal court.240  In a legal chal-
lenge, the standard of review is “arbitrary and capricious,” so
that “the BLM is provided with the ability to ignore state and
F. Shogren ed., 1998) (citing U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., FACTS ABOUT THE EN-
DANGERED SPECIES ACT (1995)).
234 Fischman, supra  note 224, at 456. R
235 See, e.g ., John F. Turner & Jason C. Rylander, The Private Lands Challenge:
Integrating Biodiversity Conservation and Private Property , in PRIVATE PROPERTY
AND THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT: SAVING HABITATS, PROTECTING HOMES,
supra  note 233, at 92-137 (describing, among other examples, a conservation agree- R
ment between Plum Creek Timber, and federal and state officials to allow timber
harvest in Montana’s Swan Valley while enhancing grizzly bear habitat, thus
preventing the need for a section 7 consultation).
236 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1782 (2006).
237 43 U.S.C. § 1712(c)(9).
238 Id.
239 Id.
240 See id.
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local plans if it can provide a rational basis for doing so.”241  As
one observer concluded, Congress enacted provisions such as
these to encourage federal agencies to be informed by state and
local concerns, but it did not intend to compromise the authority
of the federal government over these resources.242  As such, the
Federal Land Policy and Management Act did not provide any
substantive guidance for intergovernmental conflict resolution.
A different model of consistency appears in the Coastal Zone
Management Act of 1972 (CZMA), which authorizes states to
develop and administer federally funded coastal resource-man-
agement plans that meet federal standards.243  Federal activities
in zones covered by approved plans must be conducted in a man-
ner that is, “to the maximum extent practicable” consistent with
state-approved plans.244  Private actions requiring federal per-
mits or licenses in these zones require even stricter compliance
with state-adopted standards.245  In private cases the state must
certify that such actions will be consistent with the coastal-man-
agement plan, and essentially have veto power over federally li-
censed or permitted activities in lands within the zone.246  The
federal government, however, retains substantial authority over
the scope of state authority,247 and the veto power does not ex-
tend to actions on federal lands.248  The CZMA does offer a sig-
nificant opportunity for state governments to work cooperatively
with federal officials in land-use decisions along their coastlines.
C. Intergovernmental Dispute-Resolution Processes
1. The Coastal Zone Management Act
In addition to a process for determining the consistency of
state and federal coastal-management plans, the CZMA contains
a provision requiring the Secretary of Commerce, with the coop-
eration of the Executive Office of the President, to “seek to me-
241 Jeffrey L. Beyle, A Comparison of the Federal Consistency Doctrine Under
FLPMA and the CZMA , 9 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 207, 222 (1989).
242 Hope M. Babcock, Dual Regulation, Collaborative Management, or Layered
Federalism: Can Cooperative Federalism Models from Other Laws Save Our Public
Lands?  3 HASTINGS W.-NW.J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 193, 206 (1996).
243 16 U.S.C. §§ 1451-66 (2006).
244 16 U.S.C. § 1456(c)(1)(A).
245 See id. § 1456(c)(3)(A).
246 See id.
247 See, e.g. , Beyle, supra  note 241, at 212. R
248 See id.
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diate the differences” between federal agencies and states over
development, initial implementation, and administration of
coastal-management plans.249  The CZMA does not prescribe the
manner of mediation but does require that it include public hear-
ings in affected local areas.250
The CZMA’s implementing regulations provide some addi-
tional guidance for this process, although its emphasis is on the
voluntary nature of the mediation, stating that “[i]n certain cases,
mediation by the Secretary . . . may be an appropriate forum for
conflict resolution.”251  The parties must first attempt to resolve
their own differences, but either party may request “informal as-
sistance” from the Assistant Administrator in the case of serious
disagreement.252  If the problem still is not resolved, either party
may submit a written request for the Secretary to engage in me-
diation.253  This mediation process “shall last only so long as the
parties agree to participate,”254 and shall terminate if either party
withdraws, or if the process extends beyond fifteen days and the
parties do not agree to an extension.255  Perhaps most signifi-
cantly, the regulations make clear that state or federal agency
parties may choose whether to participate in this process, provid-
ing that “judicial review where otherwise available by law may be
sought by any party to a serious disagreement without first hav-
ing exhausted the mediation process” provided by law.256  In
other words, the only mandatory aspect of the mediation process
provided in the CZMA is the obligation of the Secretary of Com-
merce to make it available to state and federal governmental
bodies experiencing a serious disagreement.
2. The Clean Water Act
The closest parallel to CAA section 164(e) appears in the
CWA’s provision for recognizing the sovereign authority of In-
dian tribes.257  In addition to requiring the EPA to promulgate
regulations specifying how the Agency will treat tribes as the
249 16 U.S.C. § 1456(h).
250 Id.
251 15 C.F.R. § 923.54(a) (2006).
252 Id. § 923.54(b).
253 Id. § 923.54(c).
254 Id. § 923.54(d).
255 Id.  § 923.54(e).
256 Id. § 923.54(f).
257 33 U.S.C. § 1377(e)(2006).
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equivalent of states for implementation of the CWA, section
518(e) provides that:
The Administrator shall, in promulgating such regulations,
consult affected States sharing common water bodies and pro-
vide a mechanism for the resolution of any unreasonable con-
sequences that may arise as a result of differing water quality
standards that may be set by States and Indian tribes located
on common bodies of water.258
In regulations adopted pursuant to this statute, the EPA out-
lined a detailed process for invoking a dispute-resolution mecha-
nism.259  Either the state or a tribe may request that the EPA
resolve such a dispute, but the parties must explain the steps they
have taken to resolve it before involving the Agency.260  The
EPA’s regional administrator then must notify interested individ-
uals and groups261 and has the discretion to “include an NPDES
permittee, citizen, citizen group, or other affected entity.”262  The
regulations authorize the EPA to use (in descending order of
preference) mediation, arbitration, and a “default procedure” in
which the EPA makes a recommendation to resolve the
dispute.263
Most importantly, although the statute appears to give the
EPA broad authority to resolve disputes if mediation or arbitra-
tion fails, the Agency declined this role, explaining in its
rulemaking comments, “the default procedure is simply the
Agency reviewing available information and issuing a recommen-
dation for resolving the dispute.  The EPA’s recommendation in
this situation would have no enforceable impact.”264  The legisla-
tive history does not demonstrate conclusively that Congress in-
tended the EPA to resolve disputes under the CWA in the same
fashion as under the CAA, but one commentator who studied
258 Id. § 1377(e)(3).  This is sometimes referred to as the “Tribes as States” provi-
sion. See  Redesignation of the Yavapai-Apache Reservation to a PSD Class I Area;
Dispute Resolution, 61 Fed. Reg. 56,450, 56,455 (Nov. 1, 1996).
259 See  40 C.F.R. § 131.7 (2006).  These are far more detailed provisions than have
been adopted to guide implementation of CAA section 164(e).
260 Id. § 131.7(c)(2).
261 Id.  § 131.7(d).
262 Id. § 131.7(g)(2).
263 Id. § 131.7(f).  For a similar dispute-resolution system, see the Yellowstone
River Compact Commission, described in MCKINNEY & HARMON, supra  note 1, at R
243-44.
264 Amendments to the Water Quality Standards Regulation that Pertain to Stan-
dards on Indian Reservations, 56 Fed. Reg. 64,876, 64,888 (Dec. 12, 1991) (codified
at 40 C.F.R. pt. 131).
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the record concluded that the CWA “can also support a reading
that Congress intended to authorize a stronger role” than that
provided by section 164(e) of the CAA.265  Regardless, “the
Agency has consistently taken the position that it cannot resolve
disputes over the objections of parties.”266  Another commenta-
tor suggested that the EPA’s reluctance to make binding deci-
sions in such cases argues in favor of state-tribal compacts to
resolve water-quality disputes.267
Despite these differing interpretations of statutory authority,
the Agency’s experience implementing the CWA section 518(e)
dispute-resolution mechanism is instructive for our analysis of
CAA section 164(e).  For example, we discussed earlier un-
resolved questions concerning which parties should participate in
a 164(e) negotiation process.268  In a 1996 decision, the Tenth
Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the EPA’s interpretation of
CWA section 518(e) when the City of Albuquerque objected to
the Agency’s requirement that only states or tribes could initiate
the process.269  The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals reasoned:
The need for a dispute resolution mechanism to resolve unrea-
sonable consequences stems from the possibility that two sov-
ereigns—a state and a tribe—may impose different water
quality standards on a common body of water.  It is reasona-
ble, therefore, to allow only those two sovereigns to initiate
the dispute resolution process to resolve their differences
rather than to include affected permittees such as Albuquer-
que.  As successfully occurred through the negotiated settle-
ment in this case, the dispute resolution mechanism allows the
state and tribe to invite third parties to participate.270
Thus, although regulated entities or environmental groups may
not initiate a dispute-resolution process, there is nothing in the
statute preventing their participation once it is started.
265 Denise D. Fort, State and Tribal Water Quality Standards Under the Clean
Water Act: A Case Study , 35 NAT. RESOURCES. J. 771, 792 (1995).
266 Id.  at 792 n.109.
267 Robin Kundis Craig, Borders and Discharges: Regulation of Tribal Activities
Under the Clean Water Act in States with NPDES Program Authority , 16 UCLA J.
ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 1, 2 (1997-98).
268 See infra  Part II.B.
269 Albuquerque v. Browner, 97 F.3d 415, 429 (10th Cir. 1996).
270 Id.  at 427.
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3. The Healthy Forests Restoration Act of 2003
The Healthy Forests Restoration Act of 2003 included several
sections aimed at encouraging federal agencies to engage in col-
laborative processes in planning, prioritizing, and implementing
hazardous-fuel-reduction projects.271  For example, the Act re-
quires the U.S. Forest Service and the BLM to give priority to
recommendations contained in “community wildfire protection
plans,” which must be developed through collaborative processes
involving local governments, local fire agencies, and state for-
estry agencies, and in consultation with stakeholders and
FLMs.272
In a separate section concerning environmental analysis, Con-
gress directed federal agencies to encourage meaningful public
participation by facilitating “collaboration among State and local
governments and Indian tribes, and participation of interested
persons, during the preparation of each authorized fuel-reduc-
tion project.”273
Similar language in previously enacted public-land-manage-
ment legislation mandates collaborative processes.274 Accord-
ingly, the federal resource-management agencies have
incorporated statements encouraging collaboration into their im-
plementing regulations and operational manuals.275  It is clear
that a shift in agency practice is underway, with an attempt to
271 See  Pub. L. No. 108-148, 117 Stat. 1887 (2003) (codified at 16 U.S.C. §§ 6511-
6591 (2006)).
272 16 U.S.C. § 6511(3)(A).
273 16 U.S.C. § 6514(f).
274 See, e.g. , Secure Rural Schools and Community Self-Determination Act of
2000, Pub. L. 106-393, § 205 114 Stat. 1607 (2000).  The Act established Resource
Advisory Committees as the primary means of funding special projects through fed-
eral payments to support counties, and required the provision of “early and continu-
ous coordination with appropriate land management agency officials.” Id.
§ 205(b)(3). The Act also required the provision of “frequent opportunities for citi-
zens, organizations, tribes, land management agencies, and other interested parties
to participate openly and meaningfully, beginning at the early stages of the project
development process.” Id. § 205(b)(4).
275 See, e.g. , U.S. FOREST SERVICE, FOREST SERVICE HANDBOOK 2409.19, RE-
NEWABLE RESOURCES HANDBOOK, CHAPTER 60, STEWARDSHIP CONTRACTING
§ 61.12(a) at 21 (2005), available at  http://www.fs.fed.us/ forestmanagement/projects/
stewardship/direction/index.shtml.  This chapter includes a list of “Principles of Col-
laboration,” which include: (1) identify and involve relevant stakeholders, (2) design
a strategy to conduct an open, inclusive, and transparent process, and (3) plan for
implementation and evaluation as part of the collaborative effort.” Id.
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engage affected parties earlier in the process and thus forestall
the need for conflict resolution later.276
276 For an excellent analysis of both the benefits and limitations of collaboration
in addressing public-land conflicts, see Martin Nie, Governing the Tongass: National
Forest Conflict and Political Decision Making , 36 ENVTL. L. 385, 469-76 (2006).
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